Abu Yūsuf Yaʻqūb ibn ʼIsḥāq aṣ-Ṣabbāḥ al-Kindī (Arabic: أبو يوسف يعقوب بن إسحاق الصبّاح الكندي, Latin: Alkindus) (c. 801–873 AD), known as "the Philosopher of the Arabs", was a Muslim Arab philosopher, polymath,mathematician, physician and musician. Al-Kindi was the first of the Muslim peripatetic philosophers, and is unanimously hailed as the "father of Islamic or Arabic philosophy" for his synthesis, adaptation and promotion of Greek and Hellenistic philosophy in the Muslim world.
Al-Kindi was a descendant of the Kindatribe. He was born in Basra and educated in Baghdad. Al-Kindi became a prominent figure in the House of Wisdom, and a number of Abbasid Caliphs appointed him to oversee the translation of Greek scientific and philosophical texts into the Arabic language. This contact with "the philosophy of the ancients" (as Greek philosophy was often referred to by Muslim scholars) had a profound effect on his intellectual development, and led him to write hundreds of original treatises of his own on a range of subjects ranging frommetaphysics, ethics, logic and psychology, to medicine, pharmacology, mathematics,astronomy, astrology and optics, and further afield to more practical topics like perfumes, swords, jewels, glass, dyes, zoology, tides, mirrors, meteorology and earthquakes.
In the field of mathematics, al-Kindi played an important role in introducing Indian numerals to the Islamic and Christian world. He was a pioneer in cryptanalysis and devised several new methods of breaking ciphers. Using his mathematical and medical expertise, he was able to develop a scale that would allow doctors to quantify the potency of their medication.
The central theme underpinning al-Kindi's philosophical writings is the compatibility between philosophy and other "orthodox" Islamic sciences, particularly theology. And many of his works deal with subjects that theology had an immediate interest in. These include the nature of God, the soul and prophetic knowledge. But despite the important role he played in making philosophy accessible to Muslim intellectuals, his own philosophical output was largely overshadowed by that of al-Farabi and very few of his texts are available for modern scholars to examine.
Life
Al-Kindi was born in Kufa to an aristocratic family of the Kinda tribe, descended from the chieftain al-Ash'ath ibn Qays, a contemporary of Muhammad. The family belonged to the most prominent families of the tribal nobility of Kufa in the early Islamic period, until it lost much of its power following the revolt of Abd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad ibn al-Ash'ath. His father Ishaq was the governor of Kufa, and al-Kindi received his preliminary education there. He later went to complete his studies in Baghdad, where he was patronized by the Abbasid caliphs al-Ma'mun (ruled 813–833) and al-Mu'tasim (r. 833–842). On account of his learning and aptitude for study, al-Ma'mun appointed him to the House of Wisdom, a recently established centre for the translation of Greek philosophical and scientific texts, in Baghdad. He was also well known for his beautiful calligraphy, and at one point was employed as a calligrapher by al-Mutawakkil.
When al-Ma'mun died, his brother, al-Mu'tasim became Caliph. Al-Kindi's position would be enhanced under al-Mu'tasim, who appointed him as a tutor to his son. But on the accession of al-Wathiq (r. 842–847), and especially of al-Mutawakkil (r. 847–861), al-Kindi's star waned. There are various theories concerning this: some attribute al-Kindi's downfall to scholarly rivalries at the House of Wisdom; others refer to al-Mutawakkil’s often violent persecution of unorthodox Muslims (as well as of non-Muslims); at one point al-Kindi was beaten and his library temporarily confiscated. Henry Corbin, an authority on Islamic studies, says that in 873, al-Kindi died "a lonely man", in Baghdad during the reign of al-Mu'tamid (r. 870–892).
After his death, al-Kindi's philosophical works quickly fell into obscurity and many of them were lost even to later Islamic scholars and historians. Felix Klein-Franke suggests a number of reasons for this: aside from the militant orthodoxy of al-Mutawakkil, the Mongols also destroyed countless libraries during their invasion. However, he says the most probable cause of this was that his writings never found popularity amongst subsequent influential philosophers such as al-Farabi and Avicenna, who ultimately overshadowed him.
Accomplishments
Al-Kindi was a master of many different areas of thought and was held to be one of the greatest Islamic philosophers of his time.
The Italian Renaissance scholar Geralomo Cardano (1501–1575) considered him one of the twelve greatest minds of the Middle Ages. According to Ibn al-Nadim, al-Kindi wrote at least two hundred and sixty books, contributing heavily to geometry (thirty-two books), medicine and philosophy (twenty-two books each), logic (nine books), and physics (twelve books). His influence in the fields of physics, mathematics, medicine, philosophy and music were far-reaching and lasted for several centuries. Although most of his books have been lost over the centuries, a few have survived in the form of Latintranslations by Gerard of Cremona, and others have been rediscovered in Arabic manuscripts; most importantly, twenty-four of his lost works were located in the mid-twentieth century in a Turkish library.
Philosophy
His greatest contribution to the development of Islamic philosophy was his efforts to make Greek thought both accessible and acceptable to a Muslim audience. Al-Kindi carried out this mission from the House of Wisdom (Bayt al-Hikma), an institute of translation and learning patronized by the Abbasid Caliphs, in Baghdad. As well as translating many important texts, much of what was to become standard Arabic philosophical vocabulary originated with al-Kindi; indeed, if it had not been for him, the work of philosophers like Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and al-Ghazali might not have been possible.
In his writings, one of al-Kindi's central concerns was to demonstrate the compatibility between philosophy and natural theology on the one hand, and revealed or speculative theology on the other (though in fact he rejected speculative theology). Despite this, he did make clear that he believed revelation was a superior source of knowledge to reason because it guaranteed matters of faith that reason could not uncover. And while his philosophical approach was not always original, and was even considered clumsy by later thinkers (mainly because he was the first philosopher writing in the Arabic language), he successfully incorporated Aristotelian and (especially) neo-Platonist thought into an Islamic philosophical framework. This was an important factor in the introduction and popularization of Greek philosophy in the Muslim intellectual world.
Astronomy
Al-Kindi took his view of the solar system from Ptolemy, who placed the Earth at the centre of a series of concentric spheres, in which the known heavenly bodies (the Moon, Mercury, Venus, the Sun, Mars, Jupiter, and the stars) are embedded. In one of his treatises on the subject, he says that these bodies are rational entities, whose circular motion is in obedience to and worship of God. Their role, al-Kindi believes, is to act as instruments for divine providence. He furnishes empirical evidence as proof for this assertion; different seasons are marked by particular arrangements of the planets and stars (most notably the sun); the appearance and manner of people varies according to the arrangement of heavenly bodies situated above their homeland.
However, he is ambiguous when it comes to the actual process by which the heavenly bodies affect the material world. One theory he posits in his works is from Aristotle, who conceived that the movement of these bodies causes friction in the sub-lunar region, which stirs up the primary elements of earth, fire, air and water, and these combine to produce everything in the material world. An alternative view found his treatise On Rays is that the planets exercise their influence in straight lines. In each of these, he presents two fundamentally different views of physical interaction; action by contact and action at a distance. This dichotomy is duplicated in his writings on optics.
Some of the notable astrological works by al-Kindi include:
The Book of the Judgement of the Stars, including The Forty Chapters, on questions and elections.
On the Stellar Rays.
Several epistles on weather and meteorology, including De mutatione temporum, ("On the Changing of the Weather").
Treatise on the Judgement of Eclipses.
Treatise on the Dominion of the Arabs and its Duration (used to predict the end of Arab rule).
The Choices of Days (on elections).
On the Revolutions of the Years (on mundane astrology and natal revolutions).
De Signis Astronomiae Applicitis as Mediciam ‘On the Signs of Astronomy as applied to Medicine’
Treatise on the Spirituality of the Planets.
Optics
Two major theories of optics appear in the writings of al-Kindi; Aristotelian and Euclidean. Aristotle had believed that in order for the eye to perceive an object, both the eye and the object must be in contact with a transparent medium (such as air) that is filled with light. When these criteria are met, the "sensible form" of the object is transmitted through the medium to the eye. On the other hand, Euclid proposed that vision occurred in straight lines when "rays" from the eye reached an illuminated object and were reflected back. As with his theories on Astrology, the dichotomy of contact and distance is present in al-Kindi's writings on this subject as well.
The factor which al-Kindi relied upon to determine which of these theories was most correct was how adequately each one explained the experience of seeing. For example, Aristotle's theory was unable to account for why the angle at which an individual sees an object affects his perception of it. For example, why a circle viewed from the side will appear as a line. According to Aristotle, the completesensible form of a circle should be transmitted to the eye and it should appear as a circle. On the other hand, Euclidean optics provided a geometric model that was able to account for this, as well as the length of shadows and reflections in mirrors, because Euclid believed that the visual "rays" could only travel in straight lines (something which is commonly accepted in modern science). For this reason, al-Kindi considered the latter preponderant.
Through the Latin version of the De Aspectibus, Al-Kindi partly influenced the optical investigations of Robert Grosseteste and Roger Bacon.
Medicine
There are more than thirty treatises attributed to al-Kindi in the field of medicine, in which he was chiefly influenced by the ideas of Galen. His most important work in this field is probably De Gradibus, in which he demonstrates the application of mathematics to medicine, particularly in the field of pharmacology. For example, he developed a mathematical scale to quantify the strength of drug and a system, based the phases of the moon, that would allow a doctor to determine in advance the most critical days of a patient's illness.
Chemistry
As an advanced chemist, he was also an opponent of alchemy; he debunked the myth that simple, base metals could be transformed into precious metals such as gold or silver. He is also credited as the first distillers of alcohol, creating the "Alkindus distiller" which was used for the distillation of alcohol.
Mathematics
Al-Kindi authored works on a number of important mathematical subjects, including arithmetic, geometry, the Indian numbers, the harmony of numbers, lines and multiplication with numbers, relative quantities, measuring proportion and time, and numerical procedures and cancellation. He also wrote four volumes, On the Use of the Indian Numerals (Ketab fi Isti'mal al-'Adad al-Hindi) which contributed greatly to diffusion of the Indian system of numeration in the Middle-East and the West. In geometry, among other works, he wrote on the theory of parallels. Also related to geometry were two works on optics. One of the ways in which he made use of mathematics as a philosopher was to attempt to disprove the eternity of the world by demonstrating that actual infinity is a mathematical and logical absurdity.
Cryptography
Al-Kindi is credited with developing a method whereby variations in the frequency of the occurrence of letters could be analyzed and exploited to break ciphers (i.e. cryptanalysis by frequency analysis). His book on this topic is Risāla fī Istikhrāj al-Kutub al-Mu'amāh (رسالة في استخراج الكتب المعماة; literally: On Extracting Obscured Correspondence, more contemporary: On Decrypting Encrypted Correspondence ).
Music theory
Al-Kindi was the first great theoretician of music in the Arab-Islamic world. He is known to have written fifteen treatises onmusic theory, but only five have survived. He added a fifth string to the 'ud. His works included discussions on the therapeutic value of music and what he regarded as "cosmological connections" of music.
Philosophical thought
Influences
While Muslim intellectuals were already acquainted with Greek philosophy (especially logic), al-Kindi is credited with being the first real Muslim philosopher. His own thought was largely influenced by the Neo-Platonic philosophy of Proclus,Plotinus and John Philoponus, amongst others, although he does appear to have borrowed ideas from other Hellenistic schools as well. He makes many references to Aristotle in his writings, but these are often unwittingly re-interpreted in a Neo-Platonic framework. This trend is most obvious in areas such as metaphysics and the nature of God as a causal entity. Earlier experts had suggested that he was influenced by the Mutazilite school of theology, because of the mutual concern both he and they demonstrated for maintaining the singularity (tawhid) of God. However, such agreements are now considered incidental, as further study has shown that they disagreed on a number of equally important topics.
Metaphysics
According to al-Kindi, the goal of metaphysics is the knowledge of God. For this reason, he does not make a clear distinction between philosophy and theology, because he believes they are both concerned with the same subject. Later philosophers, particularly al-Farabi and Avicenna, would strongly disagree with him on this issue, by saying that metaphysics is actually concerned with being qua being, and as such, the nature of God is purely incidental.
Central to al-Kindi's understanding of metaphysics is God's absolute oneness, which he considers an attribute uniquely associated with God (and therefore not shared with anything else). By this he means that while we may think of any existent thing as being "one", it is in fact both "one" and many". For example, he says that while a body is one, it is also composed of many different parts. A person might say "I see an elephant", by which he means "I see one elephant", but the term 'elephant' refers to a species of animal that contains many. Therefore, only God is absolutely one, both in being and in concept, lacking any multiplicity whatsoever. Some feel this understanding entails a very rigorous negative theology because it implies that any description which can be predicated to anything else, cannot be said about God.
In addition to absolute oneness, al-Kindi also described God as the Creator. This means that He acts as both a final and efficient cause. Unlike later Muslim Neo-Platonic philosophers (who asserted that the universe existed as a result of God's existence "overflowing", which is a passive act), al-Kindi conceived of God as an active agent. In fact, of God as the agent, because all other intermediary agencies are contingent upon Him. The key idea here is that God "acts" through created intermediaries, which in turn "act" on one another – through a chain of cause and effect – to produce the desired result. In reality, these intermediary agents do not "act" at all, they are merely a conduit for God's own action. This is especially significant in the development of Islamic philosophy, as it portrayed the "first cause" and "unmoved mover" of Aristotelian philosophy as compatible with the concept of God according to Islamic revelation.
Al-Kindi’s best known treatise is the metaphysical study, Fi al-Falsafa al-Ula (On First Philosophy). Aristotelian influence can be seen in certain elements, such as the four causes. However he is Aristotelian only up to a point. The point of divergence is reached over the question of the origin of the world. Aristotle teaches the eternity of the world; Al-Kindi propounds creation ex nihilo. The later philosophers, such as al-Farabi, are usually considered to understand Aristotle more accurately; they had the advantage of better translations and a greater number of works. In Fi al-Falsafa al-Ula, al-Kindi described the first philosophy, which is also the most noble and highest philosophy, as the knowledge of the first truth, including the cause of every truth (the first cause). The first cause is prior in time because it is the cause of time. By the study of philosophy, people will learn the knowledge of things in reality, and through this the knowledge of the divinity of God and his unity. They will also learn human virtue. Throughout many of his treatises, al-Kindi emphasizes the importance of the intellect (‘aql) and contrasts it with matter.
He also discusses the One Truth, which is another name for God, and states that it does not have any attributes, predicates or characteristics. This view is consonant with the Mu‘tazili declaration of the unity of God as being strictly without attributes, and consequently al-Kindi has sometimes been deemed to be a Mu‘tazili by scholars.
Other aspects of his position include emphasis on the absolute unity of God, his power – particularly as creator – and creation ex nihilo. The Eternal, that is God, is not due to another; he has no cause and has neither genus nor species. There is no ‘before’ for the Eternal. The Eternal is unchanging, immutable and imperishable. In human terms, death is the soul’s taking leave of the body, which it employed during life. For al-Kindi, the intellect continues. Perhaps the soul is primarily the locus of the intellect. He reiterated in his ethical treatise the idea that humans must choose the world of the intellect over the material world (see §3).
Al-Kindi differs from the Hellenistic philosophical tradition primarily in espousing the belief that the world was created ex nihilo. In Aristotelian metaphysics the Prime Mover set the world in motion, but in the Hellenistic tradition, time and motion are intrinsically linked. Matter set in motion is eternally existing, since it exists before motion (and therefore before time). In this system, time is defined as the extension of the series of movements. Thus time begins with movement. In al-Kindi’s system, matter, time and movement are all finite, with a beginning and a cessation at some future point. Other subjects that concern al-Kindi can be seen from his titles, includingFi wahdaniya Allah wa tunahiy jirm al-‘alam (On the Unity of God and the Limitation of the Body of the World), and Fi kammiya kutub Aristutalis wa ma yahtaj ilahi fi tahsil al-falsafa (The Quantity of the Books of Aristotle and What is Required for the Acquisition of Philosophy).
In his philosophical writings, al-Kindi does not so much direct arguments to the concerns of religion as avoid them altogether, instead describing a parallel universe of philosophy. He consistently tries to show that the pursuit of philosophy is compatible with orthodox Islam. The mutakallimun had previously speculated on questions about matter, atoms and substance, which he also considers. Another reason for the claim that he was a Mu‘tazili was his persecution by the Khalif al-Mutawwakil, who instigated a reactionary policy against the Mu‘tazili and a return to traditionalism (see Ash‘ariyya and Mu‘tazila). Al-Kindi was caught in the general net of the Khalif’s anti-intellectualism; the Kindian emphasis is always on rationalism, an attitude which the orthodox establishment of a revealed religion is bound to find inimical.
Ethics
Al-Kindi’s ethics and practical philosophy are most discussed in a treatise Fi al-hila li-daf‘ al-ahzan (On the Art of Averting Sorrows), of questionable authenticity. Fehmi Jadaane (1968) argues that al-Kindi was strongly influenced by the Stoic tradition, particularly the thought of Epictetus, which was known throughout the Islamic world at the time through contact with Syriac Christian scholars, if not through specific texts. Epictetus emphasized the importance of freedom from the world and human beings’ status as agents, who through their ultimate independence were responsible for their own happiness and independent of others. His last logical step, however, was that suicide was permissible if life was no longer worth living. This last idea is not repeated in al-Kindi.
Like the writings of the Stoics, al-Kindi’s treatise, which is of the ‘consolation of philosophy’ type, exhorts readers to concentrate on the life of the mind and the soul, not of the body (see Stoicism). Al-Kindi says that human beings are what they truly are in the soul, not in the body. Again, on the futility of looking for eternities in the visible world, he says that whoever wishes for what is not in nature wishes for what does not exist. The reader is admonished that unhappiness follows such an attitude. In this treatise, al-Kindi advocates maintaining an internal balance through the mechanism of the individual’s interior autonomy. If worldly property becomes a concern and is then lost or damaged, this will upset an individual’s mental equilibrium. Stoic ideas about the ephemeral nature of earthly goods are recalled; al-Kindi warns against attachment to favourite worldly goods, using an example from Plutarch’s On Moral Virtue. In that story, Nero receives a gift of a gorgeous, elaborate crystal tent, with which he is obviously smitten. A philosopher who is present in the crowd advises him that he has already been impoverished through his keen attachment to this object. If Nero were to lose it, the philosopher says, he will suffer because it is irreplaceable. Later when the rare object is lost at sea during transport, Nero is devastated. Scholars have argued that this treatise appears to be a mélange of wisdom literature from various Hellenistic sources, with no ideas that sound Kindian. Ibn Miskawayh refers to the ideas of al-Kindi in his treatise on ethics, Tahdib al-akhlaq.
Some ethical remarks are contained in other treatises. The virtues discussed in the treatise on definitions are wisdom, courage and temperance. A reflection of each virtue which exists in the soul is seen in the body. Virtue exists as a focal point between two extremes. Bravery, for example, is both mental and physical; it is midway between rashness and timidity.
Some reverberations of al-Kindi’s thought also continued in the twelfth-century Christian Latin West, as certain of his treatises were translated into Latin by the Scholastics, notably De intellectu (On the Intellect). In the thirteenth century Giles of Rome criticized ‘Alkindus’ with other philosophers in his work Errores philosophorum (Errors of the Philosophers). Only a portion of al-Kindi’s work survives, so judgment of him must necessarily be imperfect. However, al-Kindi’s influence endured longer in the Western Islamic tradition than in the Eastern, as reflected in the writings of the twelfth-century mystic Ibn al-‘Arabi. With al-Kindi, who pursued reason against the background of revealed religion, begins the Islamic philosophical tradition which continues with the works of Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd.
Epistemology
Al-Kindi theorized that there was a separate, incorporeal and universal intellect (known as the "First Intellect"). It was the first of God's creation and the intermediary through which all other things came into creation. Aside from its obvious metaphysical importance, it was also crucial to al-Kindi's epistemology, which was influenced by Platonic realism.
According to Plato, everything that exists in the material world corresponds to certain universal forms in the heavenly realm. These forms are really abstract concepts such as a species, quality or relation, which apply to all physical objects and beings. For example, a red apple has the quality of "redness" derived from the appropriate universal. However, al-Kindi says that human intellects are only potentially able to comprehend these. This potential is actualized by the First Intellect, which is perpetually thinking about all of the universals. He argues that the external agency of this intellect is necessary by saying that human beings cannot arrive at a universal concept merely through perception. In other words, an intellect cannot understand the species of a thing simply by examining one or more of its instances. According to him, this will only yield an inferior "sensible form", and not the universal form which we desire. The universal form can only be attained through contemplation and actualization by the First Intellect.
The analogy he provides to explain his theory is that of wood and fire. Wood, he argues, is potentially hot (just as a human is potentially thinking about a universal), and therefore requires something else which is already hot (such as fire) to actualize this. This means that for the human intellect to think about something, the First Intellect must already be thinking about it. Therefore, he says that the First Intellect must always be thinking about everything. Once the human intellect comprehends a universal by this process, it becomes part of the individual's "acquired intellect" and can be thought about whenever he or she wishes.
The soul and the afterlife
Al-Kindi says that the soul is a simple, immaterial substance, which is related to the material world only because of its faculties which operate through the physical body. To explain the nature of our worldly existence, he (borrowing from Epictetus) compares it to a ship which has, during the course of its ocean voyage, temporarily anchored itself at an island and allowed its passengers to disembark. The implicit warning is that those passengers who linger too long on the island may be left behind when the ship sets sail again. Here, al-Kindi displays a stoic concept, that we must not become attached to material things (represented by the island), as they will invariably be taken away from us (when the ship sets sail again). He then connects this with a Neo-Platonist idea, by saying that our soul can be directed towards the pursuit of desire or the pursuit of intellect; the former will tie it to the body, so that when the body dies, it will also die, but the latter will free it from the body and allow it to survive "in the light of the Creator" in a realm of pure intelligence.
The relationship between revelation and philosophy
In the view of al-Kindi, prophecy and philosophy were two different routes to arrive at the truth. He contrasts the two positions in four ways. Firstly, while a person must undergo a long period of training and study to become a philosopher, prophecy is bestowed upon someone by God. Secondly, the philosopher must arrive at the truth by his own devices (and with great difficulty), whereas the prophet has the truth revealed to him by God. Thirdly, the understanding of the prophet – being divinely revealed – is clearer and more comprehensive than that of the philosopher. Fourthly, the way in which the prophet is able to express this understanding to the ordinary people is superior. Therefore, al-Kindi says the prophet is superior in two fields: the ease and certainty with which he receives the truth, and the way in which he presents it. However, the crucial implication is that the content of the prophet's and the philosopher's knowledge is the same. This, says Adamson, demonstrates how limited the superiority al-Kindi afforded to prophecy was.
In addition to this, al-Kindi adopted a naturalistic view of prophetic visions. He argued that, through the faculty of "imagination" as conceived of in Aristotelian philosophy, certain "pure" and well-prepared souls, were able to receive information about future events. Significantly, he does not attribute such visions or dreams to revelation from God, but instead explains that imagination enables human beings to receive the "form" of something without needing to perceive the physical entity to which it refers. Therefore, it would seem to imply that anyone who has purified themselves would be able to receive such visions. It is precisely this idea, amongst other naturalistic explanations of prophetic miracles that al-Ghazali attacks in his Incoherence of the Philosophers.
Critics and patrons
While al-Kindi appreciated the usefulness of philosophy in answering questions of a religious nature, there would be many Islamic thinkers who were not as enthusiastic about its potential. But it would be incorrect to assume that they opposed philosophy simply because it was a "foreign science". Oliver Leaman, an expert on Islamic philosophy, points out that the objections of notable theologians are rarely directed at philosophy itself, but rather at the conclusions the philosophers arrived at. Even al-Ghazali, who is famous for his critique of the philosophers, was himself an expert in philosophy and logic. And his criticism was that they arrived at theologically erroneous conclusions. The three most serious of these, in his view, were believing in the co-eternity of the universe with God, denying the bodily resurrection, and asserting that God only has knowledge of abstract universals, not of particular things (not all philosophers subscribed to these same views).
During his life, al-Kindi was fortunate enough to enjoy the patronage of the pro-Mutazilite Caliphs al-Ma'mun and al-Mu'tasim, which meant he could carry out his philosophical speculations with relative ease. In his own time, al-Kindi would be criticized for extolling the "intellect" as being the most immanent creation in proximity to God, which was commonly held to be the position of the angels. He also engaged in disputations with the Mutazilites, whom he attacked for their belief in atoms. But the real role of al-Kindi in the conflict between philosophers and theologians would be to prepare the ground for debate. His works, says Deborah Black, contained all the seeds of future controversy that would be fully realized in al-Ghazali's Incoherence of the Philosophers.
